This paper designs an emission market for electricity industry based on supply function equilibrium model. It refers to major features of the existing emission market. And it is improved in (i) electricity-environment coordinated regulation, (ii) adopting the first price-quantity sealed auction for allowances allocation, (iii) penalty covering generator’s all emissions, and (iv) pricing allowances through both market bidding process and regulatory process coordinately. We depict generator’s decision as a stochastic parameter linear programming model, which provides us its bidding curve. According to market equilibrium, each generator gets its allowances at a market clearing price. We find that, (i) the new market can not only effectively motivate generator to mitigate emission individually, but also can save allowances through market process; (ii) it can be an effective instrument to pricing emission. Finally, we present a numerical simulation for its validity, and results are well fitted to the theoretical conclusions.
| Published in | International Journal of Economy, Energy and Environment (Volume 1, Issue 1) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11 |
| Page(s) | 1-7 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2016. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Electricity Industry, Emission Market Design, Supply Function Equilibrium, Complexity System Modeling
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APA Style
Shijun Fu. (2016). Emission Market Design Based on Supply Function Equilibrium Model. International Journal of Economy, Energy and Environment, 1(1), 1-7. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11
ACS Style
Shijun Fu. Emission Market Design Based on Supply Function Equilibrium Model. Int. J. Econ. Energy Environ. 2016, 1(1), 1-7. doi: 10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11,
author = {Shijun Fu},
title = {Emission Market Design Based on Supply Function Equilibrium Model},
journal = {International Journal of Economy, Energy and Environment},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
pages = {1-7},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijeee.20160101.11},
abstract = {This paper designs an emission market for electricity industry based on supply function equilibrium model. It refers to major features of the existing emission market. And it is improved in (i) electricity-environment coordinated regulation, (ii) adopting the first price-quantity sealed auction for allowances allocation, (iii) penalty covering generator’s all emissions, and (iv) pricing allowances through both market bidding process and regulatory process coordinately. We depict generator’s decision as a stochastic parameter linear programming model, which provides us its bidding curve. According to market equilibrium, each generator gets its allowances at a market clearing price. We find that, (i) the new market can not only effectively motivate generator to mitigate emission individually, but also can save allowances through market process; (ii) it can be an effective instrument to pricing emission. Finally, we present a numerical simulation for its validity, and results are well fitted to the theoretical conclusions.},
year = {2016}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Emission Market Design Based on Supply Function Equilibrium Model AU - Shijun Fu Y1 - 2016/08/28 PY - 2016 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11 DO - 10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11 T2 - International Journal of Economy, Energy and Environment JF - International Journal of Economy, Energy and Environment JO - International Journal of Economy, Energy and Environment SP - 1 EP - 7 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2575-5021 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijeee.20160101.11 AB - This paper designs an emission market for electricity industry based on supply function equilibrium model. It refers to major features of the existing emission market. And it is improved in (i) electricity-environment coordinated regulation, (ii) adopting the first price-quantity sealed auction for allowances allocation, (iii) penalty covering generator’s all emissions, and (iv) pricing allowances through both market bidding process and regulatory process coordinately. We depict generator’s decision as a stochastic parameter linear programming model, which provides us its bidding curve. According to market equilibrium, each generator gets its allowances at a market clearing price. We find that, (i) the new market can not only effectively motivate generator to mitigate emission individually, but also can save allowances through market process; (ii) it can be an effective instrument to pricing emission. Finally, we present a numerical simulation for its validity, and results are well fitted to the theoretical conclusions. VL - 1 IS - 1 ER -
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